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The exhaustion doctrine, in intellectual property law, restrains firms from restraining competi-
tion among different sellers of the same product. Thus, it restrains firms from restraining intraband
competition. In U.S. antitrust law, firms have no duty to create or tolerate competition in their own
product, and if they impose territorial restraints in the course of distributing their product, those
restraints are presumed to be efficient for the firm and efficient or at least neutral for competition
and consumers. This Essay argues that there is a gap between the intellectual property law and the
antitrust law of vertical (intraband) restraints.
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The exhaustion doctrine, in intellectual property law, re-
strains firms from restraining competition among different sell-
ers of the same product. Thus, it restrains firms from restraining
intrabrand competition. In U.S. antitrust law, firms have no duty
to create or tolerate competition in their own product, and if
they impose territorial restraints in the course of distributing
their product, those restraints are presumed to be efficient for
the firm and efficient or at least neutral for competition and
consumers. This Essay argues that there is a gap between the
intellectual property law and the antitrust law of vertical (in-
trabrand) restraints.
There is growing recognition in the world that rivalry be-
tween and among competing producers ("interbrand competi-
tion") is the essence of competition. It is that interplay that
tends to keep prices relatively close to costs, to provide choices
for consumers, and to allocate resources to their best use in view
of consumer demand.' Intrabrand competition-a producer's
product competing against itself-cannot do this job. If a pro-
ducer has market power it will use this power on its first sale. It
may use intrabrand competition to keep its distributors from
making extra profits or operating laxly, rather than increasing
sales. The producer has the incentive to "squeeze" its distribu-
tors rather than to give them the power to inflate the costs of
* Eleanor Fox is a Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York
University School of Law. This is a revised part of a paper given in 2001 at a conference
organized by Professor Hugh C. Hansen at Fordham Law School. The whole of the
Essay will be published byJuris Publications as (2002) 5 International, Intellectual Prop-
erty Law and Policy.
1. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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distribution. 2 In this sense, it is said that the producer's interest
in vertical restraints aligns with the consumer's interest.
Vertical restraints may be used to dampen competition
among competitors where the market structure and conditions
are susceptible to cartel behavior. Thus it is observed that verti-
cal minimum resale price maintenance ("RPM") can be used to
facilitate cartels and that this danger may justify a per se rule
against RPM, at least in oligopolistic markets.3 But in all other
cases (i.e., purely vertical in purpose and effect), government re-
straints on the freedom of firms to use vertical restraints cannot
create or preserve competition in any meaningful economic
sense, and it can handicap firms from realizing efficiencies.
In the 1960s, the United States had strong and rigid legal
rules against vertical restraints. These were intended to preserve
the freedom and autonomy of distributors, on the assumption
that distributors were likely to be "the little guys," people without
power in relation to producers. The background rule was called
"the free trader doctrine."4 However, as world competition be-
came robust and the quest for efficiency and competitiveness
took center stage, U.S. law and policy changed. The free trader
doctrine was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Continental
T. Vv. GTE Sylvania.5 The Court observed then and several
times since that when a single producer (i.e., not in collabora-
tion with competitors nor with an eye to. enlisting their complic-
ity) chooses to impose a vertical restraint, the restraint is nearly
always efficient, output increasing, and good for consumers, and
that government restraints (antitrust rules) against the freedom
of firms to choose how to distribute their own product are nearly
always inefficient, output decreasing, and harmful to consum-
ers.
6
2. Alternatively, a producer may decide to prevent its distributors from competing
against one another in order to guard against free riding and to focus on "real" (inter-
brand) competitors. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 724-25; see also Commission of the
European Communities, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy,
COM (96) 721 Final (Jan. 1997).
3. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 725-26.
4. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also Eleanor Fox, The
Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140 (1981).
5. See Cont'l TV, 433 U.S. at 58-59.
6. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 725; see also NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525
U.S. 128 (1998).
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What the Court has not said is that vertical restraints by
firms with market power can help the powerful firm exploit buy-
ers even while increasing output and increasing aggregate con-
sumer surplus. Why does it not make this point? Perhaps be-
cause the current Supreme Court majorities do not care; or per-
haps they believe that U.S. antitrust is and should be only about
allocative efficiency or aggregate consumer welfare (i.e., no dis-
tributional concerns); or perhaps they are concerned that anti-
trust is a poor tool to regulate or squeeze out some of the pricing
power of firms. This non-interventionist perspective corre-
sponds with the stance of U.S. antitrust law on excessive pricing.
Unlike the competition laws of most other nations, American
anti-trust law does not prohibit excessive pricing by dominant
firms. U.S. policy-makers and jurists have made a decision that
pricing and its excesses should be left to the market; that exces-
sive pricing usually attracts entry and substitutes; that if it does
not, perhaps the market should be regulated, but, in the absence
of regulation, freedom of pricing works better for the public
than antitrust intervention, which is likely to reduce incentives to
create and compete, upsetting the balance of risk and reward.7
If this philosophy underlies vertical restraints in general,
then it would seem to apply afortiori to vertical restraints chosen
by owners of intellectual property ("IP"), because the rules of IP
are about innovation itself, and restraints on the freedom to ex-
ercise one's IP right to exclusive exploitation decrease the re-
wards of innovation.8 Yet curiously, if the above view of vertical
restraints is accepted, and if the jurisdiction has an IP rule of
international exhaustion, a dominant firm without IP protection
is in a better position than a firm with IP protection, because the
former has the right to contract to keep out transhippers, and
the latter does not.
Professor Korah's paper fits nicely within this context.' Pro-
fessor Korah notes, unsympathetically, the exhaustion doctrine
within the EU, and, sympathetically, the rule of no international
exhaustion when imports come from a non-member country. If
7. See Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
8. Legal systems may, however, overprotect IP rights, and excessive protection to
one IP holder may impair incentives of competing inventors and may cause unneces-
sary harm to competition.
9. Valentine Korah, 'Consent'in Relation to Curbs of Parallel Trade in Europe, 25 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 972 (2002).
2002] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND ANTITRUST 985
a firm unilaterally exercises IP rights granted under the law of
one Member State to exclude a product that it has put on the
market in another Member State (e.g., one that has suppressed
price by price control), it (or technically the authorizing State)
violates Article 28 of the European Community ("EC") Treaty.' 0
If an IP holder prohibits parallel imports by concert, it violates
Article 81 of the EC Treaty."
Moreover, the IP holder is at risk even in the absence of
collusion and the absence of exhaustion. Under Micro Leader,
the unilateral exercise of an IP right in a Member State to keep
out low-priced parallel imports from a non-EU country is some
evidence that the price in the Member State is abusively high,
therefore that the IP holder must be dominant, and therefore
that the "excessive" price violates Article 82.12
Professor Korah applauds the Court of First Instance in
Bayer for finding no agreement where Bayer merely allocated the
supply of its product to its distributors in a unilateral effort to
prevent arbitrage. 3 She criticizes the Court of First Instance in
Micro Leader for plotting an end run around both lack of interna-
tional exhaustion and absence of concert. She criticizes the EC
doctrine of internal market exhaustion, and criticizes EC law
generally for failing to recognize that price discrimination and
the ability of a producer to segment its own markets can be the
means to increase output and sell more product, rather than to
restrain trade. Indeed, without the lid on arbitrage, making it
possible to price discriminate, the firm may not be able to serve
10. Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M.
79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amster-
dam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European
Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997). Article 28
provides that "quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent
effect shall be prohibited between Member States." Id. art. 28, O.J. C 340/3, at 51
(1997) (ex Article 30).
11. Article 81 prohibits agreements that restrict competition.
12. Micro Leader Business v. Commission, Case T-198/98, [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 886
(holding that the Commission abused its discretion in not investigating further the
complaint that Microsoft France violated EC Treaty Article 82, if not Article 81, by
charging an appreciably higher price in France for French language software than was
charged by Microsoft in Canada for the same software, and exercising copyright rights
to exclude imports from Canada). Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant position.
13. Bayer AG v. Commission, Case T-41/96, [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 4 (Oct. 26, 2000).
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the lowest priced market. 4 Both Professor Korah's praise and
her criticism find support in U.S. law and policy.
One need not conclude from the above analysis that grant-
ing freedom to producers who act unilaterally is the prescription
that serves the interests of the world. If one cares about distribu-
tion of resources (as opposed merely to efficient allocation), it is
not. However, the above analysis might cause us to rethink
whether the unilateral use of vertical restraints is the problem
and whether government proscription of vertical restraints is the
cure. We might enthusiastically applaud the commitment of
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, Hoffmann-La-
Roche, and Boehringer Ingelheim to provide South Africa with
their anti-AIDS drugs at lowest rates available anywhere in the
world.1" (I do.) But if distributors in South Africa can ship
those drugs to the United States, the UK, and Germany, under-
mining the market that pays back total costs, there will be no
low-priced drugs for South Africa after the very short term.
Thus, the problem is not about freeing trade, but control-
ling or subsidizing price. The EC rules on internal-market ex-
haustion and on parallel imports are ad hoc tools, dependent
upon fortuities, by which government can sometimes put a lid
on price without calling the intervention price control. The EC
exhaustion and competition rules Would import into all of the
EU the price regulation of the Member State that suppresses
price the most. But, of course, one hundred percent success
would mean one hundred percent failure: the market would dis-
appear.
Price is the problem, not restraint of trade. The question is:
Who should pay and how when the market does not work; espe-
cially when the market fails to provide the necessities of life?
14. See Michel Waelbroeck, Price Discrimination and Rebate Policies Under EU Competi-
tion Law, 1995 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST. 147 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1996).
15. See Rachel L. Swains, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS Medicine, N.Y.
TIMES INT'L, Apr, 20, 2001, at 1.
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